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Introduction

In 1945it wasobviousto virtuallyeveryonein the SanFrancisco
Bay
Areathatthe SanFrancisco-Oakland
BayBridgewouldsoonbe hopelesslycongested.Openedto motorvehicletrafficin 1936,thebridgewasa
hugetraticandfinancialsuccess.Financing
forthismonumental
public
workwasprovidedby HerbertHoover'sReconstruction
FinanceCorporation (RFC),whichboughtthe first$62 millionof toll-secured
revenue
bondsin late 1932.The projectwasone of Hoover'spersonalfavorites.
TheGreatEngineerhadbeen associated
withthe locationstudiesdone
forthe bridgein the late 1920s.Becauseit wasoneof RFC'searliestand
largesteffortsto createemployment
duringthe darkestdepression
days,
the presidenthopedit wouldprovea politicalas wellas an engineering
triumph.
1
Thehistoryofeffortsto dealwiththeBayBridgeproblemprovidescase
material
fordevelopinga theoryof the politicsof transport
infrastructure
projects.Therearetwoprimaryanalytical
dimensions.
Oneis the influenceof urbanrivalryon allaspectsof infrastructure
planningandimplementation.The secondconcernsthe circumstances
thatpermitrivalryinducedpoliticalstalemates
to be broken.

1. Hoover-Young San Francisco Bay Bridge Commission, Report(1930), n.p; J. Olson,
HerbertHooverand the Reconstruction
FinanceCorporation,1931-1933(Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1977).
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Urban
Rivalry
andInfrastructure
Politics
AsChristine
Rosennotesin a studyofnineteenth-century
urbanpublic
works,"infrastructural
development,
byitsverynature,usuallybenefited
somepeoplemorethanothersor benefitedsomepeoplewhilehurting
others."2
Theinherently
unevendistribution
of projectbenefits,particularlythoseof transport
projects,acrossspaceandovertimecreateslocationadvantages
forsomeplacesanddisadvantages
others.Sincecapitalin
the UnitedStatesis mobile,placesarecontinuously
competing
withone
anotherto maintain
andattractcapitalinvestment.
Thisbasicfeatureof
the U.S. urbandevelopment
processofiengivesrise,therefore,
to coalitionsof place-rooted
investors,whichformto defendandadvancelocal
interests.Infrastructure
projectsareinevitably
strategic
weaponsin the
handsof thesecoalitions,whichseek to deploythemin orderto gain
locationadvantages.
Competing
coalitions
tryto use infrastructure
projects to shapedevelopment,ratherthansimplyto respondto existing
demand
forces.3
Urbanrivalry,then,produces
controversy
regarding
allaspectsofproject planningand implementation.
The mostcoIltroversial
projectsare
metropolitan-scale
facilitiesthatwillconcentrate
benefitsin oneplaceor
in a smallnumberof placesthatarejointlypursuing
locationadvantage.
Giventhe relativeresponsiveness
of politicalstructures
at all United
Statesgovernment
levels to localconcerns,controversy
mayproduce
stalemate,
as localcoalitions
withinthe samemetropolitan
regioncollide
intheireffortstodefendandadvance
theirinterests.

Transcending
Stalemate
Thisstudyanalyzesthe possibilities
andlimitsof threewaysaround
stalemate.
Oneis throughconsensus-building.
Consensus
is achievable
if
individual
projectscanbe designedandfinanced
in a disaggregated
way,
both spatiallyand temporally,
so thatthe development
aspirations
of
manycompeting
placescanbe served.Thecontentsofthepackage
reflect
therelativepoliticalstrengths
of theparticipants
in theprocess.Classical
porkbarrelpoliticsarea speciesofconsensus-building.
Thesecondwayaroundstalemateis througha claimof politicaland
militaryprioritypublicinterestwhichcanbe usedeitherto supporta
2. C. Rosen, "InfrastructuralImprovement in Nineteenth-Century Cities: A Conceptual
Frameworkand Cases,"Journal of Urban History 12 (May 1986), 249.
3. N. Fainstein and S. Fainstein, "Regime Strategies, Communal Resistance, and Economic Forces," in S. Fainstein, N. Fainstein, R. Hill, D. Judd, and M. Smith, Restructuring
the City (New York:Longman, 1983), 245-82; D. Harvey, "The Place of Urban Politics in
the Geography of Uneven Capitalist Development," in D. Harvey, The Urbanization of
Capital (Baltimore:The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-64; P. Peterson, City
Limits(Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1981).
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Sucha claimaimsat
projector to opposeone advancedby a competitor.
projectsfromchallengebydisadtherebyprotecting
silencingopposition,
projectsthatwill
vantagedcoalitions.The argumentis straightforward:
preto politicalandeconomicstabilityormilitary
contribute
substantially
concernsof individual
parednessmustoverridenarrowself-interested
localities.In the publicworksfield)politicaland militaryclaimshave
action.The French
government
historically
been crucialin legitimating
of
reconstruction
sawfit to subsidizeHaussmann's
nationalgovernment
andpublicworks
becauseof suchconsiderations,
centralParisprimarily
concernoverunemspendinghassincebeen linkedwithgovernmental
Ironically,projectsponsorshave
politicalinstability.4
ployment-caused
asa resultofthislinkage,comingintoconflictwith
oftenbeenconstrained
government
officialsseekingto regulatepublicworksspendingsolelyin
concerns.
relationto stabilization
capital.
Thethirdwayaroundstalemateis throughaccessto financial
financiers,
andRobonceagain,workedcloselywithParisian
Haussmann,
particiwithNewYorkbondmarket
alliances
ertMosesforgedlong-lasting
pants.5Likea claimofpoliticalor militarypriority,anaccessclaimserves
projectsfromchallengesbroughtby competitors.
to protectparticular
agenciesoftencreatedto figovernmental
The relativelyautonomous
utilizedby Mosesand othersto great
nanceand buildirlfrastructure
advantage,
furtherreinforcethe protectionenjoyedby favoredprojects.
weretriedduringthethirteenAllthreeofthesewaysaroundstalemate
year-longeffortto dealwithBayBridgecongestion.Consensus-buildirlg
wasthe objectiveof the BayAreaCouncil(BAC),the regionalcorporateelite policyplanninggroup.BACwas formedin an effortto get the
region7sbig businessleadershipto organizeitself for the competitive
struggleahead.As FrancisV. Keesling,chairmanof BAC'sexecutive
issues,
committeetold a conferencediscussingpeacetimereconversion
"Whatwe aretryingto do is to solidifythe BayAreaagainstthe inroads
whichLosAngelesmightmake.Wewantto protectourselvesagainstthe
activitiesof the South,andI takemyhatoWto themfortheyarecertaiIlly
in the
regionalorganization
doinga job."BACwasthe onlyfunctioning
in eachoftheninecountiescomprisoperating
BayArea,withcommittees
ingtheregion.6
issueswerecrucialforthe council.It sawa
Trafficandtransportation
Bay
to accomodate
infrastructure
needforhugeamountsoftransportation
andeconomicgrowth.Theconcernwasthatinsufficient
Areapopulation
4. J. Garraty,Unemployment in History (NewYork:HarperandRow,1978);A. Sutcliffe?
The Autumn ofCentral Paris (London:EdwardArnold,1970).
5. D. Harvey,"Paris,18S0-1870,"in D. Harvey,Corlsciousnessand the Urban ExperiThe JohnHopkinsUniversityPress, 1985),63-220; A. Walsh,The Public's
ence (Baltimore:
MITPress,
Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations (Cambridge:
1978).
6. F.V. KeeslingPapers,Box21, Folder183, 10/17/45.StanfordUniversityLibrary;M.
Press,1959).
Scott,The San Francisco Bay Area (Berkeley:Universityof California
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transport
capacitywould"strangle"
the region,"choking
off' potential
growth,drivingbusinesselsewhere,andcausingtheregional
economyto
"stagnate"
andthendecline.BACdevelopednumerous
plansandproposalsintendedto generateconsensusregarding
unitedregion-wide
action.
Duringthe coldwar1940sand 1950srivalplacesfilledthe airwith
politicalandmilitarypriorityclaims,continuing
a strategythatBayArea
place-coalitions
had developedfollowingWorldWarI. RogerLotchin
notesthatthe BayAreaemergedas a metropolitan-military
complexin
the 1920s,as the regionsoughtmilitaryresources
in orderto stimulate
regional
economic
growth.Lotchinemphasizes
rivalry
betweenSanFranciscoandLosAngelesas the spurto BayAreamilitarization,
a strategy
thatvirtuallyall organizedgroupsin SanFrancisco
supported.
At the
sametime,thenavywassuffering
in inter-service
rivalries,
andwasseekingcivilianfriends.Duringthisperiodthe BayArealearnedto trumpet
thedefenserationale
in orderto unifytheregionandto generatesupport
forincreased
military
spending.
7
Thedowntown
SanFrancisco
financial
community
playeda centralrole
in the infrastructure
planningprocess.Annmarie
Walshnotesthat"the
principles
of the bondmarketinsistthatfinancial
considerations
should
determinepolicy."Animportant
consequence
of thiscentralroleplayed
by privatefinancialcapital,Walshargues,is thathighwayprojectsare
favoredovercommuter
railtransportation,
becauseof theprofitability
of
theformerandthe fiscalincapacity
of thelatter.8Financecapitalinstitutions,however,havebotha generalinterestin underwriting
infrastructureprojects,as well as investments
rootedin particular
places.Walsh
doesn'tattributespatialconcernsto bondmarketparticipants
thatmight
be reflectedin supportforrailrapidtransit.In the BayArea,downtown
SanFranciscofinanciers
choseto grantaccessto a metropolitan-scale
commuter
railproject BayAreaRapidTransit
(BARTArather
thanto a
bridge/highway
facilityin orderto deal with Bay Bridgecongestion.
Whilethis particular
way aroundstalematewas eventuallythe one
charted,it wasas controversial
as theothers.A unifiedregional
program
fortheBayArearemained
highlyproblematic.
Bay Area Rivalrzesand San Francisco Bay Crossings

TheoriginalBayBridgeprojectwashandledbyRFC'sSelf-Liquidating
Division.RFCwasinterestedin financing
onlythoseprojects
whichwere
certainnotto defaultontheirinterestandprincipal
payments.
Insistence
onfinancial
soundness
floweddirectlyfromRFC'sorientation
asprimarily
a banker'sorganization.9
It demandedseveralconditionsintendedto
7. R.Lotchin,
'4The
CityandtheSword:
SanFrancisco
andtheRiseoftheMetropolitanMilitary
Complex1919-1941,"
Journalof AmericanHistory65 (March1979),996-1020.
8. A. Walsh,ThePublic'sBusiness,338.
9. J. Olson,HerbertHooverand the Reconstruction
FinanceCorporation.
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financialcommitment.
minimizeand protectthe federalgovernment's
votethe
legislature
thatthe California
Amongthesewererequirements
to the bridgeandalsoapprovepaying
fundsforbuildingthe approaches
out of
costsforthe structure
andinsurance
the operating,maintenance,
statehighwayfundsratherthanfromtolls.10
agreedto theseterms,butthe resultThestatelegislaturereluctantly
causedthe conof stateandfederalfiscalconservatism
ing combination
structionof a morecrampedBay Bridgethana less cautiousfinancial
werevery
to the structure
mighthaveallowed.Approaches
arrangement
andEastBaysides,andthetrafficlanes
limitedonboththe SanFrancisco
spancarriedautomobile
on the bridgewerenarrow.Thedouble-decked
vehiclesand
trafficontheupperlevel.Thelowerdeckcarriedcommercial
whichconsistedof twosetsoftracksrunningdirectly
theBridgeRailway,
TransitTerminallocatedon the fringeof the SanFranintoa Transbay
11
ciscocentralbusinessdistrict.
fallingwell
Bridgerailpatronagewas, however,verydisappointing,
Designedto carryfiftymillionpeopleperyear,and
belowexpectations.
period,in 1941the
seventeenthousandduringthe peaktwenty-minute
railshandledjustfourteenmillion.Evenduringthe war,whenautomoduring
millionweretransported
twenty-seven
biletrafficwasconstrained,
percentofcapacity.Inonlyoneyear,
thepeakyearof 1945,justfifty-four
to meeteventheintertollrevenuessufficient
1945,wereBridgeRailway
a subsidyfrom
est costson the railportionof the bridge,necessitating
autousers.12
Toll BridgeAuthority(CTBA),the
In October1945, the California
agencythatbuiltandmanagedthe structure,approveda
state-created
studyto be madeby the Departmentof PublicWorks(DPW)of an
Bay.TheCTBAactionwassupported
additional
crossingof SanFrancisco
business,labor,andcivicgroups,ledbythe
bynumerous
andencouraged
13
recentlycreatedBayAreaCouncil.
on the baycrossingissuewerethe citiesof San
Themainprotagonists
Franciscoand Oakland,althoughthe rest of the regionwouldbecome
First,
involvedin theconflict.Thereweretwomajorpointsofcontention.
railroadtracks
San Franciscowantedto see mainlinetranscontiIlental
wouldbe requiredto
includedon the nextcrossing.A low-levelstructure
supportmainlinetrainsat acceptablegrades.Themajorrailfreightand
10. CaliforniaDivisionof SanFranciscoBayToll Crossings(hereafterSBTC),A Report
to Departmentof PublicWorkson AdditionalTollCrossingsofSan FranciscoBay, 1948,
n.p; CaliforniaToll BridgeAuthority(hereafterCTBA),Transcriptofmeeting,November
27, l9Sl. CaliforniaStateArchive,Sacramento.
11. SBTC,A Reportto DepartmentofPublicWorkson AdditionalTollCrossingsofSan
FranciscoBay;CaliforniaRailroadCommission,Reporton SurveyofInterurbanPassenger
BetweenSan Franciscoand East Bay Citiesvia the SanFrancisco-Oakland
Transportation
4, Part1, 1941,n.p.
BayBridge,Vsolume
12. SBTC,A Reportto DepartmentofPublicWorkson AdditionalTollCrossingsofSan
FranciscoBay.
13 CTBA,Transcriptof Meeting,October3, 1945.
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sideof thebay;SanFrancisco
terminals
wereon the Oakland
passenger
business,labor,andpoliticalleaderswantedto bringrailtrafficdirectly
leadersopposedthiseffortto divert
intothe city. DowntownOakland
reliefof
sawthecentralissueastheimmediate
Oakland
traffic.Downtown
nearthe
A high-levelstructure
existingmotorvehicletrafficcongestion.
to offer
appeared
travelcorridor
transbay
BayBridgein the established
thisgoal.
thebestprospectofaccomplishing
short-term
a view,reflecting
arguedthiswastoonarrow
SanFrancisco
fiture
thinking.The need wasforlong-termplanningto accommodate
BayAreagrowth.Industryandpeoplewere movingsouth,downthe
wasin northern
County.(Oakland
andintosouthernAlameda
peninsula
ontheexistingbridge
congestion
County.
) Thegoalsofrelieving
Alameda
claimed,wouldbestbe
SanFrancisco
andservingfuturedevelopment,
servedby a crossingin a locationseveralmilessouthof the present
locationwouldalsoprovidetheconditions
Sucha southerly
bridgeheads.
since
Moreover,
low-levelstructure.
fora railroad-supporting
necessary
were limited trafficenteringSan
the existingBay Bridgeapproaches
fromthe EastBaywassoonflowingon thecitystreets,as was
Francisco
crossing
Ifa southern
to thenortheast.
trafficheadingfromthepeninsula
were availablethen this throughtrafficcouldbe removedfromthe
movements.
streets,freeingthespaceforcentralcity-oriented
supported
a southern
The SanFranciscoLaborCouncilconsistently
production
crossing,reflectinga concernwith the futureof industrial
alongthe city's
firmswereconcentrated
withinthe city. Manufacturing
would
crossing
crossing.A southern
in thevicinityofa southern
bayshore
district
manufacturing
betweenSanFrancisco's
freighttransport
facilitate
andrelatedfirmsin the EastBay,as well as improvetravelconditions
sectorof the
residential
areasin the southeastern
betweenworking-class
County.
Alameda
zonesinsouthern
production
cityandindustrial
withthe possible
officialswerealsodeeplyconcerned
SanFrancisco
The
trafficproblems.
negativeimpactsof a parallelbridgeon downtown
volumeof trafficthroughthe
twobridgeswouldchannelan increasing
leadersarguedthatanelaborate
andpolitical
city'scentralcore.Technical
freeway
anddowntown
andextremelyexpensivenetworkof approach
streets
wouldbe requiredto protectdowntown
structures
distribution
was distressedat the
congestion.The city leadership
fromparalyzing
The EastBay
prospectof locallyfinancingtheseexpensivestructures.
as partof the
wouldnot likelyfavorincludingthese costlystructures
withthe effectof
bridgeproject.DPWwouldalsolikelybe concerned
14
financial
feasibility.
ontheproject's
thestructures
including
center
positionasa regional
soughtto protectits competitive
Oakland
14. CitizensPostwarPlanningCommittee,Reportto MayorRogerLapham,1945,n.p.;
E.E. Robinson,TheCasefor the SouthernCrossing,Briefof testimonyintroducedbefore
the AssemblyCommitteeon TidelandsandRelatedProblemsat its hearingin Sacramento,
Journal,February 1946.
1949,n.p; SanFranciscoBoardof Supervisors,
117
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positionin the EastBayagainstSanFrancisco
andto secureits dominant
growingpopulation
County's
wantedsouthernAlameda
designs.Oakland
to focuson Oakland,not SanFrancisco.Anotherbridgein the existing
development
transbay
trafficcorridorwouldfacilitatefurtherresidential
in thosepartsof AlamedaandContraCostaCountiescloseto Oakland.
to work,
Perhapsmanyof thesepeoplewouldcommuteto SanFrancisco
andotheractivities.
wouldbe closerforshopping
butOakland
of politicalandmilitaryclaims:Part1(1949-1952). San
Thedynamics
view
Franciscoleaderswere concernedthatDPWsharedthe Oakland
reliefofexisting
thattheonlylegitimateissueinvolvedwastheimmediate
askedoneof its U.S.
SanFrancisco
15Therefore,
bridgetrafficcongestion.
to seek a studyby the nationalmilitary
representatives
congressional
establishment.
In March1946,RichardWelchintroduceda measurein the House
takeup
Committeeto havethe NavyandWarDepartments
NavalAffairs
soughta southerncrossthe problem.In 1941Welchhadunsuccessfully
ingas a civildefensemeasurein orderto evacuatethecity.16In Aprilthe
Investigative
creatingaJointArmy-Navy
a resolution
fullHouseapproved
hadstudied
Board(JANB).Thenavywascoolto thesubject.Themilitary
crossingsin 1941andconcludedthatincreased
the questionof additional
howTruman,
fordefensepurposes.President
capacity
wasnotnecessary
Welch
disposedto the study.Congressman
ever,wassaidto be favorably
thatanyplanfora
BoardofSupervisors
SanFrancisco
toldanappreciative
secondcrossingshouldincluderailroadtracks.OaklandMayorHerbert
BeachcondemnedWelch,sayinghe wouldopposeanylow-levelstructure thatwouldblockadethe OaklandPort.The OaklandChamberof
thisblatantmoveto steer
Commerce
stoodbehirldtheirmayor,attacking
17
trafficintoSanFrancisco.
Boardcameto the BayAreato conductpublic
TheJointArmy-Navy
to the
delegation
hearingsduringthe summerof 1946.TheSanFrancisco
boardwas led by SupervisorMarvinLewis,who had stakedout the
concerns.The San
areaas one of his maingovernmental
transportation
sent Lewisto the boardhearingsarmedwith a
Frarlcisco
supervisors
resolutionstatingthatthe best
adoptedLewis-sponsored
unanimously
connectionto a
interestsof SanFranciscocalledfora mainlinerailroad
UnionDepotover any secondbay crossing.Lewisreportedbackhow
hadbeenableto presenta unitedfront
proudhe wasthatSanFrancisco
on the needfortrains;downtowninterests,laborgroups,andimproveexmentclubsall supportedthe position.LewisalsonotedOaklandys
pressec
.opposition.
1S.San Francisco Chronicle, April2, 1946;San Francisco News, May 2, 1946.
16. R. Lotchin,'The City and the Sword:San Franciscoand the Rise of the Metropolitan-Military
Complex1919-1941."
17. Berkeley Gazette, March15, 1946;San Francisco Daily Commercial News, May 1,
1946;Alumeda Times, June1, 1946.
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Alliancepossibilities
wereemergingon the issue,however.Citiesin
southernAlamedaCountywere breakingwithOakland
on the bridge
locationquestion,andagreeingwithSanFrancisco
ontheadvantages
ofa
southern
crossing.Moreover,
SanMateoCountywaslikewiseinterested
in additional
transport
capacitycloserto SanMateo.TheOakland-supportedcrossingwouldbe lessdesirable
forpeninsula
cities so theywere
liningupwithSanFrancisco
aswell.18
OnJanuary
25, 1947,JANBreportedits findings.Theboardproposed
the immediate
construction
of a southerncrossingof SanFrancisco
Bay,
butfoundtherewasn'tanyneedforrailroad
trackson thestructure.
The
boardhaddirectlyquestionedthe majorrailcarrierson thisquestion.
Theyhadallunequivocally
deniedanyinterestin extending
theirpassengerfacilitiesin the BayArea.Theboardagreedthata southernlocation
wouldbestfacilitatefutureregionalgrowth.Theyalsonotedthatwhile
therewasn'tanyneedforan additional
crossingfroma national
defense
standpoint,
securityprecautions
dictatedthatbridgestructures
be dispersedto decreasetheirvulnerability
to enemyattack.Themilitary
engineersalsopointedout thata parallelcrossingcloseto the existingone
wouldhavea harmful
effectondowntown
SanFrancisco,
worsening
traffic
congestion
there.Thiswascrucialbecausetherelativeabilityofcrossings
to enablepeakhourcommuters
to get intoandoutof the SanFrancisco
centralbusinessdistrictwasa majorlocation
criterion.
TheArmy-Navy
Boardsurprised
everyonewitha companion
recommendation
toitscallfora southern
crossing.
Theybroadened
theirfieldof
visiontoconsidertransitissuesin relationto motorvehicletraffic
andtold
theBayAreathatit wouldbe impossible
continually
toconstruct
highway
crossings
andrelatedparking
facilities.Atsomepointautomotive
congestionwouldbecomeso severethattheareawouldbe forcedto increaseits
useoftransit.Theboardproposed
thattheBayAreabegintoplannowfor
thiseventuality.
Theynotedthatextensiverailcapacity
wasalready
available,but wasseriouslyunderutilized.
This,the boardargued,wasbecausetheexistingservice,suppliedby theprivately-owned
KeySystem,
wasverypoor.Thesolutionwasa fiallyintegrated
railrapidtransitservice
usinggrade-separated
exclusiverights-of-way
in SanFrancisco
andthe
EastBay,andan underwater
tubeto makethe connection.
Theboard
evenwentso faras to consultwithvarioustunnelandothertransitengineeringexpertsona tentativeplanofroutesandestimated
costsforsucha
railsystem.Thetotalcostcamein at $208million,withthe centerpiece
tubecosting$74million.Constructing
a tubehadanadditional
benefit:
18. San FranciscoBoardof Supervisors,Journal, February11, 1946, July 15, 1946,
August19, 1946;Bay Region Business, August13, 1946;EastBaySupporters
forthe Southern Crossing,The Case for the Southern Crossing of San Francisco Bay. Presentedto
California
TollBridgeAuthority,1946,n.p.
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andpaved,therebyinthe existingBridgeRailwaycouldbe abandoned
19
creasingBayBridgemotorvehiclecapacity.
Thistransitproposaldid not createmuchof an immediatestir,however. San Franciscowas pleasedwith the locationdecision,but still
wasupsetat the
railroadtrains.Oakland
wantedthosetranscontinental
choiceof location.The transitidearecededfurtherintothe background
of PublicWorksreportedits findingsjusta
whenthe stateDepartment
construction
of anidentiimmediate
fewdayslater.DPWrecommended
calbridgeparallelto andthreehundredfeet northof the existingstrucfirmof
andrevenuestudiesdoneforDPWby theconsulting
ture.Traffie
for
the
kinds
of
studies
had
done
the
same
Coverdale
andColpitts(who
was
the
parallel
crossing
originalBayBridgeproject)indicatedthatthis
mostlikelyto divertenoughtrafficfromthe existingbridgeto makeit a
existingrailfacilitieswereconsidinvestment.Moreover,
soundfinancial
eredadequatefortransittravel.20
reportsspurredfeverishactivityallaroundthe bay.In
Theconflicting
andRealEstateBoard
ofCommerce,
Oakland
theCityCouncil,Chamber
declaredtheirallegianceto the parallelbridge.The southernAlameda
overSan
Crossing
fora Southern
the Committee
Countycitiesorganized
gotCongressFrancisco
Bayandagitatedfortheirchoice.SanFrancisco
ofthearmyandnavy asking
manWelchto intervenewiththesecretaries
studiescouldbe madeof
themto delaytheirfinalreportuntiladditional
trackson a crossing.TheBayAreaCouncil
thecostsof includingrailroad
andTrafficCommitteeto attemptreconciliaappointeda Transportation
a secondlookattheissues.21
tion.Finally,DPWundertook
ofthearmyandnavyreleasedtheir
In lateAugust1947,the secretaries
includingthe
finalreport.They agreedwith JANBin all particulars,
on a
railroadquestion;no traintrackswerewarranted
transcontinental
southern
crossing.22
Committeedissented,voting18-6in
BAC'sTrafficandTransportation
on
arguedthatreliefof congestion
favorofa parallelbridge.Themajority
the existingbridgewas the chiefpriority,and a parallelbridgewould
accomplish
this morecheaplyandeffectivelythana southerncrossing.
pointedout that
Regarding
the transitproposal,the committeemajority
the cost of the tube alonewas estimatedat $74 millionand the total
of
projectat $208million.Thecommittee"believedthatthe difficulties
sucha systemwithinthe nearfuturewouldbe
organizing
andfirlancing
andin viewof theothergreatneedsof the communities
insurmountable,
19. JointArmy-NavyBoard,An AdditionalCrossingof San FranciscoBay, 1947, n.p.
20. San Francisco Examiner,February17, 1947; CaliforniaDepartmentof Public
Works,PreliminaryStudiesfor an AdditionalCrossingof San FranciscoBay, 1947, n.p.
21. BayRegionBusiness,February6, 1947;SanFranciscoExaminer,February18, 1947;
SanFranciscoChronicle,August28, 1947;OaklandTribune,September19, 1947.
22. SanFranciscoChronicle,August28, 1947.
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atleastuntilsuch
suchanundertaking,
thatit wouldbe bettertopostp(Jl-le
TheBACBoardof Governors,
timeas existingfacilitiesareovertaxed."23
byits
submitted
however,refusedto takea voteontherecommendations
had
Eventhoughthe committee
Committee.
andTransportation
Trafflc
that
the issueswereso intenselycontroversial
a clearmajority,
produced
wereunabletoreconcilethedifferences.24
thegovernors
adoptedtheMarvin
BoardofSupervisors
InOctobertheSanFrancisco
of a southern
Lewisresolutioncallingfor the immediateconstruction
itselfabout
declared
ThiswasthefirsttimeofflcialSanFrancisco
crossing.
the locationof the next bridge.Lewisbeganto couplesupportfor a
rapid
regional
proposed
crossingwitha callto actiononJANB's
southern
politicalandtechnicalleadersarguedthat
transitsystem.SanFrancisco
finanofdowntown
theaspirations
projectswouldfacilitate
thecombined
interestsandorgacapital.An allianceof downtown
cialandmerchant
nizedlaborcould,as well, be cemented.Lewisandseveraldowntown
intheregional
soonemergedasleadingactivists
andmerchants
financiers
25
buildBART.
thatwouldeventually
rapidtransitmovement
In NovemberCTBAdeclaredthatits policywouldbe to blaildboth
for
acquisition
bridges.DPWwasto proceedwithplansandright-of-way
bothstructures.DPWDirectorCharlesPurcell,chiefengineeron the
he wouldappointa specialBay
originalBayBridgeproject,announced
whichbridgeoughtto be built
TollCrossingsDivisionto recommend
first.26
1948,RalphTudor,chiefengineerfortheBayTollCrossInNovember
bridgefirst.Hepointed
buildingtheparallel
ingsDivision,recommended
andColpittssaid
outthattrafficandrevenuestudiesdoneby Coverdale
thatthe parallelbridgeshouldhaveprioritybecausemorethaneighty
percentofthevehiclescrossingtheexistingbridgewouldbe servedbyit,
to a southerncrossing.27
whileonlytwentypercentwouldbe attracted
now
crossing
ofa southern
in support
Theunitedfrontin SanFrancisco
switchedits
beganto crumble,as the downtownbusinesscommunity
commit1949,theexecutive
bridge.InFebruary
totheparallel
allegiance
and
tee of BACdeclaredfora parallelbridgeandnotifiedthe governor
theSan
waslePcwithfewfriends:
SanFrancisco
CTBAofitsstand.Official
loyal.Eventhese
remained
LaborCouncilandthenewspapers
Francisco
andTrafficCommittee,A Reporton
23. SanFranciscoBayAreaCouncilTransportation
AdditionalCrossingsof SanFranciscoBay, 1947,n.p.
24. SanFranciscoChronicle,September12, 1947;SanFranciscoExaminer,September
12, 1947,OaklandTnbune,September20, 1947.
25. SanFranciscoChronicle,October7, 1947;S. Adler,ThePoliticalEconomyof TranD.C: UnitedStatesDepartment
sit in theSanFranciscoBayArea,1945-1963(Washington,
1980).
ofTransportation,
26. SanFranciscoExaminer,November11, 1947.
27. SBTC,A Reportto Departmentof PublicWorkson AdditionalTollCrossingsof San
FranciscoBay.
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friendsweredivided,though.Theyfavoreda southernlocationbut differedastoexactlywherethebridgeterminishouldbe.28
Thereseem to be two reasonswhy the majorbusinessorganizations
changedtheirmindson the bridgelocationissue.The moreimportant
wasthattheywere neverreallycommittedto a southernlocation.The
crucialaspectswerethe transcontinental
trainsanda downtown
passengerterminal.Onlya southerncrossingcouldaccommodate
trains,so the
businesscommunitysupporteda southerncrossing.Whenit became
clearthereweren'tgoingto be anyrailroad
passengers
comingdirectly
downtown,the businessgroupslookedto othershort-range
alternatives
thatwouldincreasedowntownreceptioncapacity.A parallelbridgeappearedmoreappropriate
forthis.Theotherreasonwasthatit lookedasif
a parallelbridgewasgoingto be builtanyway.Thiswaswhatthe state
wantedto do;the bridgewasa localmatter.Themilitaryengineershad
alreadysaidtherewasn'ta needforanotherbridgefroma national
defense
standpoint.Moreover,downtowngroupsandthe BACCommitteebelievedthatconstruction
of an underwater
transittubewasa verylongterm,uncertain
prospect,giventhe costandcurrenttransitdynamics.
If
additionalfreewayswere necessaryto avoidcongestioncausedby the
increasednumberof motorvehiclesin centralSanFrancisco,
then,the
businessgroupsthought,theseoughttobe built.
A San Francisco Chronicle writerthoughthe hadfoundsomealliesfor
offlcialSanFrancisco's
causewhentheUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentativesArmedServicesCommittee
chairman
madecorrespondence
between
himselfand
thesecretary
ofthenavypublic.Included
wasawarningfrom
a
navyvice-admiral
thattheparallelbridge"violated
thefundamental
strategicprincipleof dispersion."
TheChronicle reporterfeltthe navywaspolitelytryingto tell CTBAto giveuptheparallelbridge.Thismessagewas
lost,however,on the California
TollBridgeAuthority.
A fewdayslaterit
votedunanimously
to construct
a parallelcrossingof SanFrancisco
Bay.29
The partiesthen shiftedto Washington,
D.C., wherethe BayArea
woulddo battlein Congressoverlegislationsponsored
by U.S. Senator
Knowland,
whosupporteda parallelbridge.TheSenateArmedServices
Committeewasthe terrain;a parallelbridgewouldneeda permitfrom
the militaryto establisha bridgehead
on militarypropertyin the middle
of the bay. The parallelbridgeforceswere led by BayAreaCouncil
executivevice-president
andgeneralmanager
FrankMarsh.
Hearingswere held in the nation'scapitalduringJuly1949.Parallel
bridgesupporters
triedto convincethe senatorsthatthiswasa strictly
28. San Francisco Examiner, December 4, 1947, December 17, 1947; San Francisco
Chronicle, December 6, 1947, March 5, 1949; Oakland Tribune, December 18, 1947,
November 25, 1948, December 12, 1948; Oakland Post-Enquirer, February 16, 1949; Bay
Region Business, March 17, 1949, March 24, 1949.
29. San Francisco Chronicle, March 21, 1949; San Francisco Examiner, March24, 1949.
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localissue.Sincefederalmoneywasnot involved,Congressshouldlet
takecareof its ownlocationdecisions.BACtoldthe Senate
California
thatthe fightagainsttheparallelbridgeandforthe southern
Committee
one by peoplewhowantedto see their
crossingwasa "self-interested"
propertyvaluesin the southernpartof SanFranciscoand downthe
increased.BACdeclaredthatthegeneralinterestin therelief
peninsula
overany"proon theexistingbridgemusttakeprecedence
ofcongestion
of the SanFrancisco
projects.The executivevice-president
motional"
the majorbusinessgroupsin
of Commerce
saidthatobviously
Chamber
his city thatsupportedthe parallelbridgewouldnot be doingso if it
EngineerRalphTudorstressed
investments.
wouldharmtheirdowntown
whowouldeverfinanceconthe BridgeRailway;
thefollyin abandoning
expensivetube?Thiswouldresultif theparalstruction
ofanenormously
crossing
built,becausetheBay
lel bridgewereblockedandthe southern
Areawouldstillbe forcedto increaseBayBridgemotorvehiclecapacity.
turn.30
MayorRobinson's
ThenitwasSanFrancisco
of San
ElmerE. Robinson
"Mayor
to the OaklandTribt4ne7
According
in aneffort
Francisco
. . . pulledoutallthe stopsfromfearto patriotism
solejudgmentin
to the federalgovernment
to transferfromCalifornia
Robinson
askedthecommittee:32
locatinga secondcrossingof the Bay.''3l
peninontheSanFrancisco
happening
Canyouenvisionanemergency
sula?Canyou imaginemorethana millionanda halfhumanbeings
their
tryingto jamthemselves,theirbabiesandtheirbabycarriages,
andon foot,the
birdsandtheircatsandtheirdogs,theirautomobiles
througha
lameandthe haltandthe blind,tryingto forcethemselves
tryingto get acrossthisbottlein conflictwiththe military
bottleneck
thatscene?Thatis
defense?
Canyouenvision
necktodoajobofnational
notwhatwe wantin anypartofthisNationofours.Thatis notwhatwe
andthe
Thatis notwhatwe wantin SanFrancisco;
wantin California.
and
by thethousands
peopleoutthere,I assureyou. . . arespeaking
ofthousands
.
hundreds

<'Mr.
Mayor. . .
hereto aska question:
intervened
SenatorKnowland
areyou,thatin the eventof sucha catastrophe
youarenotcontending,
thatyoumention,thatthepeoplefromPaloAltoonupwouldallnormally
flowinto. . . San Franciscowhen thereis a greatlandconnection."
responded:
MayorRobinson
If youcantell me
I willansweryou in thisway,SenatorKnowland.
wheretheenemyis goingto strike,I willtellyouwherethepeoplewill
comes,theyrunawayfromthe bullets,nottoflee. Whenevacuation
wardsthem,andif the enemycomesfromthe Southor strikesat the
dodownin thisarea,andif he comesup
South,whichhe maylogically
thatway,theyaregoingtoruntothebottleneck.
Oakland Tribune, July 7, 1949.
30. San Francisco Chronicle, July 3, 1949;
31. Oakland Tribune, July 8, 1949.
32. United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings: Easementfor Con96-g9.
struction of Toll Crossing of San Franctsco Bay (July 8, 1949),
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A fewweekslaterSanFrancisco
wasvindicated;
Secretary
of Defense
LouisJohnsonaffirmed
theunequivocal
opposition
ofthenational
military
establishment
to a parallelbridge.33
TheSenateturneddownKnowland
s
billto grantaneasementoverfederalpropertyafterJohnsonspoke.The
Oakland
Trxbune
editorialized
a callto continuethe fightfora parallel
bridge,adding,"Theunsubstantiated
statementof a 'military
preference'
is beingusedin aneffortto prohibitconsideration
ofthecrossingproblem
fromthe onlyproperstandpoint,the best interestsof the peoplewho
mustcrosstheBay."34
By the end of 1949the bridgecontroversy
hadproduceda stalemate.
Theparallelbridgewasapparently
blocked.However,therewereas yet
no meansavailableto builda southerncrossing.BACwentbackto work
tofindanacceptable
regionalprogram.
Theperilsof consensus-building
(1949-1953).In October1949,the
BayAreaCouncilrecommended
a forty-fivemilliondollarprogramto
improvethe BayBridgeandbuildadditional
approaches.
RalphTudor
approved,agreeingthatthe improvements
wouldprovidesometemporaryreliefandimprovesafetyontheexistingstructure.
BACfollowedthis
minimum
program
a yearlaterwitha MasterPlanof BayTollCrossings,
whichincludednorthernandsouthernbridgesacrossthebay(thoughnot
in thesamelocationsascurrentproposals).
BACpatiently
workedtounite
theregionbehinditsshort-term
andlong-term
plans,eventually
evercoming MayorRobinson's
opposition,whichwasbasedon a threathe perceivedto the financial
viabilityof thesoutherncrossing.Alameda
Senator
Breedthenintroduced
legislationduringthe 1951sessionto accomplish
theimprovement
program.35
TheBreedbill authorized
CTBAto continueto collecttollsto finance
constructionof additionalapproachesand improvements
to the Bay
Bridge.Theamountof moneyspenton the additions
wasto be the same
on bothsidesof the bay.In addition,the billauthorized
studiesto bring
plansforthe southerncrossingup to parwiththe workalreadydoneby
DPWon the parallelbridge.36
However,as the Breedbillwoundits way
throughthe Senate,a new elementwas interjectedinto the BayArea
bridgequestion.Thefieldof competition
broadened
assenatorsfromthe
othernorthern
California
counties,concerned
abouttherelationofbridge
projectfinancing
to the statehighwayfund,decidedit wastimethe Bay
Areasettledanolddebt.
33. SanFranctsco
Chronicle,
July22, 1949.
34. Oakland
Tribune,
July22, 1949,editorial.
35. SanFrancisco
Examiner,
November1, 1949;SanFrancisco
Chronicle,
November1,
1949; SBTC,Alterations
andApproaches
to the SanFrancisco-Oakland
BayBrtdgeas
Suggested
bySanFranctsco
BayAreaCouncil,1949,n.p; SanFranciscoBayAreaCouncil,
"Chronological
History:AdditionalCrossingsof SanFranciscoBay,"November2, 1951.In
EarlWarrenPapers,Box 311, Divisionof Highways-Bridges,
7-12/51.CaliforniaStateArchives,Sacramento.
36. CaliforniaSenate,Bills,SenateBill 451, 1951.
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Theoriginal
legislation
provided
thatthemoniesadvanced
to buildthe
approaches
be repaidto the statehighwaysystemwhenbridgebonds
were retired.The Breedbill providedfor this repayment.However,
SenatorGeorgeHatfieldof MercedCounty,supported
by his associates
fromthe northerncounties,wantedanynew issueof bondsto include
fundsto repayall the moneyspentto operate,insure,andmaintain
the
bridgeall theseyears.Moreover,
the Hatfieldgroupwantedthe bill to
providethatsuchexpensesin thefuturebe borneoutoftollsratherthan
by statehighwaymonies.The Hatfieldcontingent
wantedhighways
for
theirconstituents;
theydidn'tsee anyreasonwhytheirnewroadfunds
shouldbe decreased
anylongertosupportBayAreabridges.
SenatorBreedsecuredamendments
to his bill accommodating
Hatfield.SanFrancisco,
though,wasupsetby thisturnof events.SanFranciscoSenatorO'Gara
soughtfirtheramendments
eliminating
therepaymentof operating,insurance,andmaintenance
expenses.Whenthese
failedO Garaappealedto the Assemblyto bottleup the billuntilmore
hearings
couldbe held.TheAssembly
wentalongwithO'Gara
andkilled
the Breedbill. SanFranciscofearedthese additional
expenseswould
threatensoutherncrossingfinancing.
BACwentbackto workrounding
up support.37

MayorRobinson
helda meetingwithOakland
MayorClifford
Rishell,
theOakland
Chamber
ofCommerce
president,
andafewtechnicians;
this
groupworkedout a proposalwhichthey plannedto takedirectlyto
CTBA.Theywerehopingthatlegislative
actionwouldnotbe necessary
so
thatthe conflictthatbrokeout duringthe 1951sessioncouldbe bypassed.Thisstrategem
failed,however.CTBArefusedto proceedin the
face of oppositionfromthe northerncounties.Since San Francisco
wouldn't
acceptthe demandsof the Hatfieldgroup,the statelegislature
refilsedto authorize
CTBAactionon BAC'sproposed
additions/improvementsprogram.38
It wasnowthreeyearssincetheBayAreaCouncilfirstproposed
fixing
up the BayBridge;the consensus-building
program
hadn'tgottenvery
far.MayorRobinson
decidedit wastimeforboldaction.Withthesupport
of MarvinLewis,MayorRobinson
announced
in lateNovember,1952,
thathe had"cometo theconclusion
thattheimpasse
withreference
tothe
buildingofadditional
Baycrossings
mustbe terminated."
Themayorand
MarvinLewisnowsupported"simultaneous"
construction
of twoadditionalbridges,onenorthandonesouthoftheexistingone.SanFrancisco
shoulddecidewherethe terminals
wouldbe on its side;the EastBay
citiesshoulddo likewise.Robinson
notedthe BridgeAuthority
hadal37. CTBA,Transcriptof Meeting,November27, 1951.
38. CTBA,Transcriptof Meeting,November27, 1951;SanFranciscoBayAreaCouncil,
Memorandum
of Meetingwith MayorElmerRobinsonre: San Franctsco-Oakland
Bay
Bridge,August3, 1951.In EarlWarrenPapers,Box311, Divisionof Highways-Bridges,
712/51.
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readydeterminedthat both additionalcrossingswere necessary.He
statedthathe wassatisfiedtherewouldn'tbe anyproblemin financing
construction
ofbothprojectssimultaneously.
39
The BayCrossingsCommitteeof EastBayCommunities,
led by the
Oakland
Chamberof Commerce,applauded
thisstatesmanlike
behavior
by SanFrancisco's
mayor.The committeeresolvedits approvalof the
simultaneous
construction
proposal
andurgedimmediate
actionto implementthe program.BACinformedthe governorof the new initiative.40
Thisnew-found
optimismdidnot,however,longsurvive.
In earlyDecemberDPWDirectorFrankDurkeeinformedGovernor
Warrenof a conversation
he hadhadwithMr.JohnInglis,of the Blyth
andCompanyinvestmentbankingfirm.In a confidential
memoDurkee
toldWarrenthat"Mr.Inglisvolunteered
the statementthat,in hisview,
theremightbe considerable
difficulty
in financing,
underexistingconditions,twoadditional
crossingsof SanFrancisco
Bayif the crossings
were
tobe undertaken
simultaneously."
InglisfeltthatsufEcient
revenuebonds
to financesimultaneous
construction
couldnotbe absorbed
bythemoney
markets.Durkeewrotethathe didn'tknowif Inglis'viewsaccurately
reflectedthoseofotherbondhouses,butthe DPWdirectorremindedthe
governor
that,"asyouknow,Mr.Inglishasbeeninterestedin practically
everyissueof revenuebondsheretoforeput out by the California
Toll
BridgeAuthority.''4l
JustbeforeChristmas
SanMateoCountyAssemblyman
Richard
Dolwig,
asouthern
crossing
champion,
conducted
ahearingaboutthisnewproposal
forsimultaneous
construction.
StateLegislative
AuditorRobertStelmack
told the hearingthatinvestmenthouseshad statedthatrevenuebond
financing
forsimultaneous
construction
couldnotbesecured.
42
Assemblyman
Dolwig,however,seizedthe initiativeduringthe 1953
statelegislativesession.He drafteda billthatplaceda southerncrossing
at the topof the BayAreainfrastructural
agenda,at leastas farthe state
wasconcerned.The1953DolwigActprovidedthattollsshouldbe continued on the BayBridgeeven afterall bondswerepaidoff, andthatall
surplusrevenuesaccruingtherefrom
wereto be usedto financea southerncrossingof SanFranciscoBay.A set of approaches
andterminals
on
bothsidesof the baywere includedas partsof the project.CTBAwas
39. Office of the Mayorof San Francisco,Statementof MayorElmer E. Robinson,
ReferenceBay Bridges,November20, 1952. In EarlWarrenPapers,Box311, Divisionof
Highways-Bridges,
9-12/52.
40. BayCrossingCommitteeof EastBayCommunities.Resolution,November26, 1952.
In EarlWarrenPapers.Box311, Divisionof Highways-Bridges,
9-12/52;SanFranciscoBay
AreaCouncil,FrankMarchMemorandum
to the SanFranciscoBayAreaCouncil.December 3, 1952. In Earl WarrenPapers, Box 311, Division of Highways-Bridges,
9-12/52.
41. F. Durkee, Memorandumto Earl Warren. December 3, 1952. In Earl Warren
Papers.Box311, Divisionof Highways-Bridges,
9-12/52.
42. B. Booker,ReporttoJ . Flemingon Meetingsof StateAssemblySubcommittee
on Bay
AreaProblems. December22, 1952.In EarlWarrenPapers.Box311, Divisionof HighwaysBridges,9-12/52.
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necessary
federal
securing
stepsincluding
to takeallnecessary
instructed
crossing.Dolwigwassureto
andpermitsto buildthesouthern
legislation
requestedby SenatorHatfieldandhisassociates:
includethe conditions
fundwouldbe repaidforhistoricBayBridgeexpenses,
thestatehighway
costs;andallsuchfiature
andoperating
insurance,
maintenance,
including
costswouldbepaidfromtolls.43
in a manner
hadfinallyresolvedthecontroversy,
Thestatelegislature
thatreflectedthe strengthof the allianceDolwighadbeenableto construct.However,as in 1949,a battlehadbeenwon,butthewarwasnot
counterleadersfelt betrayedby theirSanFrancisco
yet over.Oakland
the ideaof
hadabandoned
leadership
partsbecausethe SanFrancisco
stillhada fewWashingOakland
Moreover,
construction.
simultaneous
hadto give its
ton, D.C. optionsavailable.The nationalgovernment
to continuetollcollectionon the BayBridgeto helpfinance
permission
wassaidto be seeking
WilliamKnowland
Senator
construction.
additional
thatwouldwouldguarfederallegislation
to thenecessary
anamendment
crossingwasfinished.
anteebuildinga parallelbridgeafterthe southern
leaders
bridge,Oakland
In1949,whenCTBAwantedtobuilda parallel
leaders
toldthe Congressthiswasa purelylocalmatter.SanFrancisco
nowsaidthesamething.Theconflictbetweenthecities,however,wasas
obviousin 1953asit hadbeenin 1949.TheHousePublicWorksCommithe offeredtheBayArealeaderstheuse
notedthebitterness;
teechairman
ratherthancomebeforethe
roomto achieveconsensus
ofhisconference
pointedout one of the well-known
Congressdisunited.The chairman
wasloatheto
a higherlevelof government
procedure:
rulesof legislative
thatlocalpeople
enterintoconflictsata lowerlevel.It wasfarpreferable
withoutoutsideintervention.
workouttheirdifferences
thatthere
MayorRishellangrilytoldthe HouseCommittee
Oakland
butSanFrancisco
withSanFrancisco,
hadalreadybeentwoagreements
offiered
anamendment
wasnowsupporting
hadrunoutonthem.Oakland
thatwouldspecifyin the federal
by an AlamedaCountyrepresentative
crossing.
thesouthern
thata parallelbridgebe builtfollowing
legislation
so speto writesomething
reluctant
TheHouse,however,wasobviously
passed
haddeclinedto do so.44Congress
cificwhenthe statelegislature
continuedtollcollectionbutrefusedto includea
authorizing
legislation
Thenextstepwasa
parallelbridgeconstruction.45
mandating
provision
waters.It lookedlikesmooth
permitfromthe armyto crossnavigable
crossing.
sailingforthesouthern
Parell (1953-1956). In
cluims:
of politicalandmilitary
Thedynamics
crossing
proposouthern
August,1953,thenavyshockedthecelebrating
43. California,Statutes,Chapter1056,1953.
44. United StatesHouse of Representatives,Committeeon PublicWorks,Hearings,
June23, 1953.
Congress,FirstSession,PublicLaw154,Chap45. UnitedStatesCongress,Eighty-third
ter248, 1953.
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nentsbyopposingDPW'srequestto thearmyfora permit.Thenavygave
a flat"No'to the WestBaylocationspecifiedin the DolwigActbecause
the navyhadplansforpossibleseaplanedevelopment
in the area.These
planswereso newandso secretthatthe BayAreanavyofficialwhomade
publicthe opposition
didnotknowanyof the details.Thiswasa decision
takenat the toplevelof the navycommand
in Washington;
thelocalnavy
peoplewereas surprisedas everyoneelse. TheSanFrancisco
Examiner
editorially
chargedthat"political"
considerations
motivated
the navyaction. Moreover,just as the Tribunehadarguedthatmilitaryconcerns
wereinappropriately
beingput forwardin 1949,the Examinernowfelt
thenavyhadgottenoutofline:46
[When]the Navyattemptsto graboffa vastexpanseof the Baywatersfor
some possible future need, when the Navy springsits demandsas a
complete and patently intentionalsurprisethat prevents city offlcials
from cross-examiningto develop the facts, when the Navy would so
casuallykilla multimilliondollarcivilianbridgeproject,we saythe Navy
hasoverreacheditself.

SanFranciscomobilizedto wringconcessions
forthe navy.Underintense pressurethe navybent sufficiently
to allowa modifiedsouthern
crossingproject.The bends,however,increasedconstruction
costsand
presentedsignificant
engineering
difficulties.
During1954,though,DPW
wasableto securethe necessaryarmypermits;the stateengineersthen
settledintothedetaileddesignworknecessary
to developa financing
and
construction
program.47
Sevenyearsafterthe JointArmy-Navy
Boardhadproposedit, a southerncrossingwasfinallyat the topof the BayAreatransportation
agenda.
The 1953 DolwigAct declaredthe southerncrossingto be the next
transbay
transport
facility.The crossingwasgrantedexclusiveaccessto
surplusBayBridgerevenues,therebyassuringa sourceof incomeforthe
project.
The successof the southerncrossingproponents
wouldbe extremely
consequential
forthefuturehistoryoftheregionalrailrapidtransitmovement.In theJointArmy-Navy
Boardplanthecrossingandregionalrapid
transitwerecomplementary
elementsin a comprehensive
solutionto Bay
Areatransportation
needs.Theseelementswould,however,increasingly
comeinto conflictwith eachother.In addition,the finaldefeatof the
parallelbridgechangedthe character
of the Oakland
leadership's
participationin the regionalrapidtransitmovement.Oakland
hadsuccessfully
parriedSanFrancisco's
thruststowardregionalrapidtransitsinceMarvin
Lewisseizedtheinitiativein 1948.Sucha systemappeared
to Oakland
as
anobviouseffiort
to penetraterapidlygrowingperipheral
areasin theEast
Bay, therebyconsolidating
downtownSan Francisco's
leadingposition
46. SanFranciscoExaminer,August20, 1953,editorial.
47. SBTC,ProgressReport, SouthernCrossing,1954, n.p; San FranciscoExaminer,
August25, 1953,September2, 1953;SanFranciscoChronicle,August26, 1953.
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overits resicentralbusinessdistrictdominion
anddenyingthe Oakland
Theynowbecamefarmoreinterestedin the movedentialhinterlands.
hadbeen.48
thantheypreviously
andpossibilities
ment'sprogress
planin theinfrastructure
of accessto projectfinance
ThesigniJicance
ningprocess(1955-1958). In December1955,ChiefEngineerNorman
on
reported
BayTollCrossings
C. Raabof the Divisionof SanFrancisco
the progressof southerncrossingwork.Raabfoundthecrossingfeasible
thoughdifficult.It wouldalsobe exfroman engineeringstandpoint,
whichdid
tremelyexpensive.Basedon trafficandearningsprojections
not assumeeitherregionalrapidtransitor changesin the BayBridge,
Raabestimatedthat$180millionworthof revenuebondscouldbe sold
cents.Thisamount
at the currenttwenty-five
withthe toll remaining
crossing;there
wouldbe sufficientto constructonly a "minimum"
andonly
to the crossingin SanFrancisco
wouldn'tbe anyapproaches
in the EastBay.Anincreasein thetollto thirty-five
minimal
approaches
to buildthe
to raisethe$250millionnecessary
centswouldbe necessary
entireprojectas outlinedin the 1953DolwigAct.49Aftera decadeof
athand,thiswasverydisheartbitterconflictandwithvictoryseemingly
Alameda
County
SanMateo,andsouthern
eningnewsto SanFrancisco,
activists.
onproposfromtheseareasbeganworking
Inearly1956representatives
viable.Theyvoluntarprojectfinancially
crossing
alstomakethesouthern
constraint:
bridgetollswouldremainat their
ily acceptedan important
centlevel. By AprilDolwigwasableto securesupcurrenttwenty-five
to his1953Act
fortwocriticalamendments
portfromthestatelegislature
crossingwithout
of the "minimum"
whichwouldenableconstruction
cent toll. Moreover,GeorgeBurpee,leading
touchingthe twenty-five
andColpitts,saidthe $180
figurein the consultingfirmof Coverdale
be financed
withcoulddefinitely
program
construction
millionfirst-stage
crossing
projectthushadthe
southern
outraisingthetoll.Theminimum
studiesforBayArea
blessingsof the firmthathadbeendoingfinancial
thatno
bridgessincethefirstsuchprojects.Dolwigvoicedgreatoptimism
in theway.CTBAwasreadyto proceedwitha
moreobstaclesappeared
bondissue.50
Thepathof the railrapidtransitmovement,however,nowbeganto
Planrecommended
crossing.
TheOptimum
intersectthatofthesouthern
(BARTC),
to the BayAreaRapidTransitCommission
by the consultants
ofanextensiverail
in January
1956,calledfortheconstruction
published
tube
rapidtransitsystemin the EastandWestBays,andanunderwater
The
centralbusinessdistricts.
andOakland
the SanFrancisco
connecting
48. S. Adler, The Political Economy of Transitin the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-1963 .
49. SBTC, Report to the Department of Public Works on the Southern Crossing of San
Francisco Bay, 1955, n.p.
50. San Francisco Chronicle, March 3, 1956, San Francisco Examiner, April 3, 1956;
California,Statutes, Chapter 67, First ExtraordinarySession, 1956.
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tubewasthekeyelementcementinganallianceofthetwodowntowns.
It
wouldallowEastBaytrainstoconvergeincentralOakland
beforecrossing
the baywithoutseriouslyextendingtraveltimeto downtownSanFrancisco.ThisdesignwouldenableSanFranciscoandOaklandto co-exist
peacefully,
jointlypursuingtheiraspirations
in the EastBay.Moreover,
theconsultants
arguedthatthecombination
ofa tubeanda reconstructed
BayBridge whichthe tubewouldmakepossiblc wouldeliminatethe
needfora southerncrossingforatleastfifteenyears.Thetransitmovement
leadership
begantoexpressinterestinthesurplusBayBridgetollrevenues
currerstly
reservedforthesouthern
crossing.
51
In a March1956newsstory,the San FranciscoChronic1quotedBay
AreaRapidTransitCommission
Chairman
AlanBrowneas callingfor
postponement
ofthesoutherncrossingbecausethecrossingmightjeopardize the regionalrapidtransitplan.Brownepointedto the suggestion
madeby Stanford
ResearchInstituteforusingbridgetollsfortransit.He
alsonotedthe OptimumPlanwouldmakea southerncrossingunnecessaryforthetimebeing.52
A fewdayslaterthe Chroniclebeganto reconsider
its historicsupport
foranadditional
motorvehiclefacility.AneditorialnotedAlanBrowne's
positionthatbotha southerncrossingandrapidtransitwerenot financiallypossible.Brownewasquotedas arguingthattherewere"financial
relationships
betweenthe. . . rapidtransitplanand the. . . crossing
planthattend to makethem mutuallyexclusive."
The Chronicletook
specialnoticeof Browne'scommentthathe didn't"thinkwe shouldrisk
everything
foronemorecrossingoftheBay.. . . Whatis moreimportant
forthefutureofthearea,movingcarsorpeople?I thinkmovingpeopleis
moreimportant."53
Legislationsponsoredby BARTCwas introduced
at the statecapitol
whichwouldexempta rapidtransittubefromtheprohibition
onconstructionof a baycrossingwithinten milesof anexistingtollbridgeon which
bondswere still outstanding.San Franciscoofficialsrespondedto the
measurewithextremeambivalencea
as didRichard
Dolwig.SanFrarlciscansworriedthatsupportforthe tubeat thistimewouldjeopardize
the
southerncrossing.Dolwigwassimilarly
concerned.However,SanFranciscoalsowantedregionalrapidtransit.Afterlengthyandagonizing
discussions,officialSanFrancisco
adoptedthepositionthatit wouldsupport
legislation
exemptinga transittubefromthe ten-mileprohibition
onlyif
investmentbankersgaveassurances
thiswouldnotjeopardizesouthern
crossingfinancing.
MayorGeorgeChristopher
pointedolltthatthebridge
wasstillthecity'stoptransportation
priority.54
Dolwigannouncedthathe hadreceivedsuchassurances
fromthe inS1. S.Adler,ThePoliticalEconomyof TransitintheSanFranciscoBayArea,1945-1963.
52. San FranciscoChrontcle,March16,1956.
53. San FranciscoChronicle,March19, 1956,editorial.
54. SanFranciscoChronicle,March
13, 1956,March17,1956.
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vestmentcommunity
shortlytherealter,
thattherewouldn't
be anyconflict.Theinvestment
peoplewereprimarily
concerned
thatthelegislation
enablingtransittubeconstruction
be passedbeforethe crossingwasfinanced,so thatno changeswouldbe madein midstream.
Theseassuranceswereapparently
sufficient
forDolwigandSanFrancisco;
thetransit
billwaspassedattheendofApril,justafterDolwig's
ownamendments
to
thesoutheIncrossing
legislation
wereenacted.
55
However,in December1956,CTBAwasinformed
byits financial
consultants,Smith,BarneyandCompany,
thatrevenuebondsfora minimum
southern
crossingprojectsecuredby a twenty-five
centtollwouldnotbe
saleablein themoneymarkets
atthattime.Smith,Barneyconcluded
that
"therevenuebondfinancing
necessary
to financeits [minimum
southern
crossing]
construction
wouldnotcomplywithallofthegenerally
accepted
investmentstandards
for suchsecuritiesand. . . must,therefore,be
considered
marginal
astofinancial
feasibility."56
Thiswas,of course,aninteresting
andconsequential
pronouncement.
GeorgeBurpeeof Coverdaleand Colpittshadsaidjust eightmonths
previously
thattheminimum
crossing
projectwasfinancially
feasible.The
criticalroleof membersof the financial
community
in the publicworks
planning
processseemsparticularly
evidentatthispoint.BankofAmerica
andBlythandCompany
werethe leadingcommercial
andinvestment
banking
firmsin the region.Theyhadalwaysbeencloselyinvolvedwith
CTBAfinancing
efforts.AlanBrowne,chairman
of the BayAreaRapid
TransitCommission,
wasa Bankof America
vice-president
in chargeof
municipal
bonds.ArthurDolan,anotherleadingBARTC
member,wasan
officialin theinvestment
banking
firmof BlythandCompany.
Bothmen
wereunderwater
tubesupporters.
Smith,BarneyandCompany
would
serveas financial
advisorsto the BayAreaRapidTransitDistrict.These
representatives
of the San Franciscofinancialdistrictwere expressing
theirpreference
fortransitratherthananotherbridgecrossingin a most
effiective
manner,relHecting
theirgeneralaswellasplace-specific
interest
in the benefitsthe proposeddowntown/radial
railrapidtransitsystem
wouldconfer.57
Financialaccesshad seriousconsequences
for downtownSanFrancisco,however.Havinglost a projecttheyhadfoughtlongandhardto
secure,thepeninsula
countiesofSanMateoandSantaClaraseveredtheir
tiestotheregionaltransitmovement.
SantaClararefusedeventojointhe
BayAreaRapidTransitDistrict(BARTD)
createdby thestatelegislature
in 1957.Exercising
an optionincludedin the district-creation
lawat its
insistence,SanMateowithdrew
a fewyearslater.WhenSanMateowithdrew,MarinCountywasforcedto join the exodus,sincethe property
55. San Francisco Chronicle, March15, 1956;California,Statutes, Chapter40, First
Extraordinary
Session,1956.
56. CTBA,Transcript of Meeting, December12, 1956.
57. S. Adler,The Political Economy of Transitin the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-1963 .
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valuesof the shrunken
districtwouldnotbe ableto supporttheconstructionof an expensiveGoldenGatecrossing.A severelytruncatedBART
systemlimpedonto the ballotin 1962,afterbarelysurvivinganother
challengein ContraCostaCounty.
Justas Oaklandhadarguedbeforethe defeatof the parallelbridge,
localcoalitionsin the peninsulacountiesopposedthe regionaltransit
projectas an instanceof the imperialaspirations
of downtown
SanFrancisco. San Mateoand SantaClarasoughttransportinfrastructure
that
wouldfacilitatetheiraspirations
forautonomous
economicdevelopment.
Ontheirbehalf,as well as thatof southernAlameda
County,duringthe
same1957sessionthe legislature
appropriated
moneyforstudiesleading
to plansanda bondissueto atleastdoublethecapacity
oftheexistingSan
Mateo-Hayward
Bridge,seventeenmilessouthof the BayBridge.San
Mateoand SantaClarawouldeachcreatetheirowntransitdistrictsas
well.58
BayTollCrossingsDivisionEngineerNormanRaabwasnowdirected
to studythereconstruction
ofthe BayBridge.Hisworkwasfinanced
with
a $50,000emergency
appropriation
madepossiblebythestatelegislature.
Thelegislators
notedCTBAmustbe inapositiontocommence
reconstructionworkwithoutdelayif andwhenKeySystemstrains,whichhadbeen
runningacrossthe BridgeRailwaysince 1939,were abandoned.Key
Systemwascurrentlybeforethe California
PublicUtilitiesCommission
seekingpermissionto substitutebusesfortrainson its transbay
routes.
Raabreportedin March1957thatthe BayBridgecouldbe reconstructed
so as to increaseits trafficcarryingcapacityby twenty-five
to thirty-five
percent.RaabproposedpavingtheBridgeRailways
lanesandestablishing
onewaytrafficon eachdeck.He estimatedthe costof reconstruction
at
thirty-fivemilliondollars.Soon thereafter)the UtilitiesCommission
grantedKeySystempermission
to abandon
theBridgeRailway
trainsand
substitutebuses. In Aprilthe statelegislaturetookup a bill enabling
CTBAto reconstruct
the BayBridgeforgeneraltraffic.Thebillprovided
thatBayBridgerevenuescurrently
available
andavailable
through
July1,
1961couldbe usedto financereconstruction.59
In earlyApril1958,DPWreportedto CTBAthatinvestmentbankers
hadindicatedonce againthatthe southerncrossingwasnot a safeand
attractiveinvestmentforprivatecapital.DPWrecommended
thatconstructionwasneitherfeasiblenorin the publicinterest.CTBAagreed.60
Justa few weekslaterthe BayAreaRapidTransitDistrictrequested
CTBAto considerbuildinga rapidtransittubeas its nextbaycrossing,
58. S. Adler, The PoliticalEconomyof Transitin the San FranciscoBay Area, 19451963,California,Statutes,Chapter2416, 1957.
59. SBTC,Reconstr7setion
of the SanFrancisco-Oakland
BayBridge,1957,n.p; California PublicUtilitiesCommission,Decisions,Number54669, 1957;California,Senate,Bills,
SenateBill 1643,1957.
60. CTBA,Transcriptof Meeting,April3, 1958.
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andto use surplusBayBridgetollrevenuesto financeits construction.
In1959thestatelegislature
authorized
CTBAtodoso.
Conclusion

In his foreword
to RobertMoses'bookaboutpublicworks,Raymond
Moleywrote:
Fromthe pyramidsof Egypt,to the rebuildingof RomeafterNero'sfire,
to the creationof the greatmedievalcathedralsandthe reconstruction
of
Parisby BaronHaussmann,all greatpublicworkshavebeen somehow
associatedwith autocraticpower. For pure democracyhas neitherthe
imagination,nor the energy, nor the disciplinedmentalityto create
majorimprovements.62

Regardless
ofwhathe meantby"puredemocracy
'2Moleyisclearlywrong
regarding
its incapacities.
Imagination,
energy,anda disciplined
mentality haveneverbeen lacking.Rather,the abundance
of these factors,
generatedby the structural
factof spatialcompetition
andsustained
by
the responsiveness
of legislativebodiesto localinvestorcoalitions,
producesa strongtendencyto stalemate
theconstruction
oflarge-scale
infrastructure
projects.TheBayAreacaseilluminates
waysinwhichstalemate
mayatleastpartially
be transcended.
TheBayAreaCouncillaboredmightilyto buildconsensusregarding
transport
investment
in the region.BACclaimedto articulate
the interestsof the regionas a wholeregarding
infrastructure
concerns.Yetcompetitivelocalitiesrepeatedly
undermined
BACeffortsto unitetheregion
behindaninvestment
program.
WhenBACsoughttoassemble
a package
of projectsdesignedto appealto numerous
competitors,
the perception
thatthe packageincludedelementsthatwouldconcentrate
benefitsdisruptedconsensus.Localcoalitionscontinuously
pursuedgovernmental
opportunities
thatwoulddefendandadvancetheirindividual
interests
outsidetheBAC-organized
consensus-building
process.
However,whileBACfailedto buildconsensusdisaggregation
wasan
essentialaspectofovercoming
thestalemate.
Thestatelegislaturealways
respectful
of localautonomy,
permittedthe peninsula
countiesto withdrawfromtheregionalrapidtransitprojectandsupported
theirquestfor
locallyorientedtransport
facilities.Asa result,a varietyof smaller-scale
projects
servingseveralsubregional
alliances
becamefeasible.
At no pointdidpoliticalor militarypriorityclaimssilenceopposition.
Whetherarguedby localprojectsponsors
or militarybranches,
all such
claimson behalfof particular
projectswereimmediately
involvedin the
locationconflict,and,therefore,suspect.Sincethe earlyhistoryof this
61. CTBA,Transcriptof Meeting,April30, 1958.
62. R. Moley,"Foreword,"
in R. Moses,PublicWorks:A DangerousTrade(NewYork:
McGraw-Hill,
1970),xi.
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controversy
coincidedwiththemostintenseperiodofcoldwarhostilityas
well as the KoreanWar,though,politicaland militaryconsiderations
carriedweight.SanFrancisco
andOakland
bothassertedsuchclaimsto
defendagainsteachother'sinitiatives.However,sincelarge-scale
unemploymentwasnot an issue,norwasthe countryimmediately
subjectto
threatfromwithout,politicalandmilitary
priorityclaimscouldnotthemselvesprovidea wayofovercoming
stalemate.
Accessto projectfinancewas decisive.However,even the financial
gatekeepers
wereconstrained
by competinglocalcoalitions.
TheCaliforniaTollBridgeAuthority
soughtto buildonlythosemotorvehiclefacilitiestheybelievedwouldbe profitable,
andto eschewinvestment
in transit. The financiersleadingthe regionalrapidtransitmovementwere,
however,able to steer the CTBAin the directionthe transitactivists
wishedto go. Thefinancial
disabilities
of transitdidforcethe movement
to seekgovernmental
subsidy,therebyopeningup the projectdecision
processto opponentsandto popularelectoralparticipation.
Thisresulted
in a muchscaled-down
projectandrelativelyfavorable
termsfor organizedtransitlaborduringthe transition
froma privateto a governmental
industry.

